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In the late twentieth century, increasing specialization in the 
construction field decreased the influence that North American archi-
tects had over the realization of their designs, even as claims to individual 
authorship became ever more important for their firms’ market competi-
tiveness. At the same time, the emergence of new specializations and new 
roles within firms showed that changes were nascent in the then-conven-
tional definition of the architect as a generalist in the art of building. 
In 1970, this situation was dramatized on the cover of The 
Canadian Architect, a trade magazine pitched at practicing profession-
als (fig. 01). In the drawing by the Japanese-Canadian graphic artist Miiko 
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A fundamental shift in employment patterns among architects in 
North America during the 1960s and 1970s impacted how particular 
kinds of tasks were either monopolized or delegated within firms. This 
article uses the archive of the U.S.-based architectural firm Gunnar 
Birkerts and Associates to show evidence of a growing gulf between 
executive architects and employee architects (particularly 
women assigned to work on interiors), as well as the persistence 
of chauvinistic ideals of practice under changed circumstances. The 
design for the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis building (1967-
73) is shown to be illustrative of this gulf between imaginative and 
interpretive labor.
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Fig. 01
Miiko Nishimura, “Pyramid of Architects,” 
cover illustration for The Canadian 
Architect, January 1970, 15, 1.
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Nishimura, a pyramidal stack of architects (seemingly all white and male) 
represents the strict conventional hierarchy of practice, while younger 
architects –recognizable by their less-traditional clothing and facial hair–
avoid this hierarchy by simply walking away from architecture altogether. 
Nishimura’s drawing accompanied a cover story that argued for restruc-
turing the business of architecture to avert the generational crisis she 
depicted. Its author diagnosed that the traditional hierarchy of archi-
tectural practice “automatically rewards age and experience out of all 
proportion to ability,” and prescribed a more horizontal structure through 
which all members of a firm would have a greater say in both managerial 
and aesthetic decisions.1  
Debates about business structure were spurred by a con-
temporaneous trend in architects’ career paths away from independent 
proprietorship and toward salaried employment in private firms. As the 
sociologist Robert Gutman observed at the time, this trend followed “the 
‘dequalification of labor.’”2 Gutman characterized this process as:
“[The] historical tendency of work to be broken down into smaller and more 
limited tasks requiring less sophisticated training and expertise, at the same 
time elevating the responsibility of a tiny segment of the professional labor 
force that has the task of coordinating and managing.”
He went on to suggest that despite the growing responsi-
bility borne by project managers and production teams, a great deal of 
authority was nevertheless still vested in the “qualified” labor of principals 
in firms. This meant that architectural firms became more hierarchical: 
firm figureheads, who we might call “executive architects,” pushed to 
consolidate their traditional territories of authorship and design signature 
for the benefit of their firm’s marketing efforts, while ever more mundane 
work by “employee architects” was required to ensure the accurate real-
ization of their vision. This was the norm of the collective efforts under-
writing authorship that employees tacitly agreed to when signing on with 
such firms.  
One might extend Gutman’s observations to arrive at a 
more general proposition about the nature of architectural work: because 
of its being positioned between the intellectual and the material, the 
imaginative and the mundane, certain classes of architectural workers 
are doubly disadvantaged by their position within the labor hierarchy of 
firms. The social theorist David Graeber described such situations as 
“lopsided structures of imagination,”3 suggesting that:  
“In the sphere of industry, it is generally those on top that relegate to 
themselves the more imaginative tasks (i.e., they design the products and 
organize production), whereas when inequalities emerge in the sphere of 
social production, it is those on the bottom who end up expected to do the 
major imaginative work –notably, the bulk of. . . the “labor of interpretation” 
that keeps life running.”
Together, the concepts offered by Gutman and Graeber 
might outline an alternative methodology for understanding how archi-
tectural authorship is produced through work based on a distinction 
between imaginative labor and interpretive labor. The distribution of 
such labor within a firm or practice is the organizational signature –as 
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opposed to an individual’s authorial signature– which outlines how work is 
delegated, how tasks are distributed, and how expertise and experience 
are mobilized within a project. An organizational signature dictates how 
the chain of authorial intention is maintained, while an imaginative design 
is interpreted so as to be extrapolated into a set of construction docu-
ments and subsequently a completed building. Organizational signature 
describes not so much the formal similarity that ties a firm’s projects 
together to form a body of work, but rather the structures of imagination, 
lopsided or otherwise, that govern its day-to-day working methods.4 
In this article, I apply the methodology proposed to the ex-
tensive archive documenting a key building designed by Gunnar Birkerts 
and Associates (GBA): the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (FRBM) 
building in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on which the firm worked from 1967 
until the building’s completion in 1973.5 GBA produced 1676 drawings, 
1009 pages of construction specifications, 163 bulletins, 702 memos, and 
63 change orders, in addition to several linear feet of correspondence 
and transmissions relating to the project. As The Architect’s Handbook 
(the flagship publication of the American Institute of Architects, the pri-
mary professional body in the United States) advised, “the technical and 
esthetic quality” of documents like these has “nearly as much to do with 
illustrating an architect’s competence and integrity as do his [sic] com-
pleted projects.”6 By foregrounding the role of paperwork in maintaining 
a firm’s reputation in this way, the Handbook gave primacy not to adher-
ence to an executive architect’s design intent, but instead to the interpre-
tation and coordination work done by their employees.7 This resonated 
with the shifting landscape of the profession during these years: ever-
more architects were serving as employees rather than executives, and 
the Handbook’s authors dignified and centered the work that these em-
ployee architects actually did. In effect, this shook up what were formerly 
understood to be the very foundations of architecture.  
Because of this imbalance, in writing the history of this 
period we must adjust our conception of “the architect” to include not 
only those remaining generalists at the top of the professional hierarchy 
satirized by Nishimura, but also those within firms who translate designs 
into instruments of service –project managers, spec writers, draftspersons, 
and interior designers. We must write of an architecture that is undecided 
beyond the schematic design phase, an object that evolves from start 
to finish. Instead of a design signature, historians should aim for an 
organizational one, asking how a particular firm responded to challenges 
posed by specialization and administration rather than to a site or build-
ing type. 
Gunnar Birkerts, the founder and figurehead of 
GBA, reflected thoughtfully on the challenges 
of hierarchy and complexity with which the 
profession was confronted in the 1960s and 
1970s. In doing so, he imagined a diagram whose 
form echoes Nishimura’s satirical pyramid: 
“I have tried to establish the relationship and proportion of these “other” or 
artistic realms to the broader base of the building design process. The base 
is large and what I am calling “me” is small, or can only emerge out of the 






Birkerts saw the primary question of contemporary prac-
tice as how to balance the proportion between the “base” of material 
labor and the “superstructure,” so to speak, of authorship.8 Because his 
role in the process may have seemed more elusive than the very real 
and material output of his employees, he prioritized artistic synthe-
sis –that which only a generalist architect could “squeeze through” the 
mundanities and bureaucracy of architectural work. In projects of the 
FRBM’s scale, the goal of firm figureheads like Birkerts was not purely 
to reduce their personal workload by delegating tasks to subordi-
nates –quite the contrary in Birkerts’s case, as he, like many architects, 
valorized the long hours he worked– but instead to reserve for them-
selves particular categories of tasks, often related to business develop-
ment, client relations, and schematic design.9 This executive attitude 
buttressed the ideology of singular creative artistry and the economic 
structure of entrepreneurial enterprise. 
In the late 1960s, Birkerts’s ideas about the design process 
mutated as the FRBM and other projects necessitated a swift leap into 
unfamiliar territory. Prior to 1967, GBA’s office protocols seem to have 
been quite different from the way Birkerts later explained them. Impor-
tantly, early in the firm’s existence, Birkerts’s schematic sketches were not 
treated with the same deference that they later commanded. Sketches for 
early projects were either discarded or in some cases misfiled, suggesting 
that they were not perceived as valuable records of the creative process 
leading to a building design. The value that ultimately accrued to process 
and presentation drawings with the rise of Postmodernism gave sketches 
a new importance for Birkerts.10 He later came to see them as the key doc-
uments of a gestation process understood as taking place largely within 
his own mind, and kept them close at hand to explain his buildings and 
projects. For the FRBM project, by contrast, few sketches were retained. 
As with many firms of its size and age, new projects at 
GBA in the mid-1960s often brought together a team of employees, some 
experienced and some untested, who learned to work together on the 
fly. The ad-hoc nature of these groupings did not, however, mean that 
existing power relationships between executive architects and employee 
architects could be disrupted.11 GBA’s relatively informal structure was ul-
timately solidified as the scale of their projects increased, with the FRBM 
as a key turning point due to the demands made by the project’s bureau-
cratic client. Despite inheriting deeply ingrained professional knowledge 
through the contracts and document formats they used, GBA employees 
had to make sense of unfamiliar management and scheduling protocols, 
as well as an unfamiliar project delivery method that introduced new roles 
like construction manager and interior designer. The project reveals how, 
over time, the dequalification of architectural work produced stricter divi-
sions of labor and a bevy of new job titles or descriptions. 
GBA did their best to limit the FRBM team’s complex-
ity, but some decisions they made instead increased it, even as Birkerts 
hoped to maintain the kind of control to which he and the project manag-
er Charles Fleckenstein had become accustomed in smaller projects. In 
the end, more than two dozen GBA employees had a hand in the project,12 
and GBA chose to work with experienced consultants to reinforce their 
supervisory authority, namely, the engineers behind Minoru Yamasaki 
and Associates’ World Trade Center in Manhattan, the construction 
of which had begun a year earlier, in the summer of 1966.13 But GBA’s 
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relative inexperience and unusual design presented challenges for their 
consultants: the structural engineering firm Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, 
Robertson (SHCR) were tasked with designing a suspension-style office 
tower, for which, as partner Leslie Robertson stated in a project descrip-
tion, “there [was] no precedent in building construction” 14; the systems 
engineers Jaros, Baum & Bolles were faced not only with intricately 
coordinating the usual building systems, but also with detailed security 
concerns that added further complexity to the project. The distance 
between the consultants’ offices in New York, Chicago, and Seattle, GBA 
near Detroit, and the construction site in Minneapolis resulted in thou-
sands of phone calls and communiqués. 
The result of all this paperwork was a building 
design consisting of opposites: heavy, secure, 
and rough below, weightless, open, and reflec-
tive above (fig. 02). Its most distinctive element 
is a catenary structure that allows the office 
block to be suspended gracefully above the 
granite-paved plaza below. This unusual structural solution became the 
building’s primary visual expression on the exterior in what seemed to be 
a flouting of Birkerts’s once-fundamental principle of “suppressing the 
structure” –which until this project applied to both the architectural form 
and the organization of his firm.15 The top level of the tower is occupied 
by a 30-foot-deep truss that resists the inward tug of the catenary on the 
building’s piers, and the bronzed-glass curtain wall further emphasized 
the presence of its suspension structure (fig. 03). Below the catenary arch, 
the glass is set flush with the arch, while above it, it is set back with struc-
tural fins that shade the space and stabilize the column-free wall.
The Federal Reserve Bank’s office tower was nestled 
onto the southwest edge of the site so as to block as little as possible of 
the view from downtown Minneapolis to the Mississippi River, just three 
blocks to the north. This resulted in a very slender office tower with 
unusually proportioned floors of about 60 x 200 feet –highly efficient 
from a daylighting perspective, but necessitating elongated circulation 
paths. Core functions such as restrooms and stairwells were pushed 
to piers at the tower’s ends, and primary access to the office floors was 
Fig. 02
Oblique view, northeast facade of the 
FRBM, ca. 1970s. Black and white print,
8 x 10 inches. Photograph by Balthazar 
Korab. hs18280, Box 13, Gunnar Birkerts 
papers (GBP), Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan (BHL). Courtesy 
the Library of Congress, Prints & 
Photographs Division, Balthazar Korab 
Collection.
Fig. 03
Photograph of the FRBM construction 
progress showing the preparation of the 
steel suspension structure, July 13, 1971. 
Black and white print, 8.75 x 10.75 inches. 
Photograph by Schwang Studio. hs18298, 











provided via a nearly freestanding elevator lobby at the center of the 
southeast facade. This left the tower’s floors free of interruptions, able to 
accommodate the variety of business functions that the Federal Reserve 
Bank required (fig. 04). The tower’s signature structural gymnastics arose 
as a way to both enable this column-free office space (a common client 
request at the time) and provide a strict separation from secure functions 
below. The main entrance to both the office tower and the secure volume 
was from Marquette Avenue, underneath the plaza (see fig. 02). The walls of 
the lobby were clad in the same warm gray granite as the plaza and piers. 
Its floor transitioned smoothly with concave granite baseboards, lending 
the space a cave-like quality akin to “a granite mountain that has been 
shaved down.”16 The catenary served as the link between these opposites 
and gave the project an enduring, distinctive image.
Fig. 04
Interior of the FRBM prior to the 
installation of furniture systems. 
Photographer unknown. hs18316, Box 19, 
GBA, BHL.
Fig. 05
Catenary sketch by Gunnar Birkerts and 
others for the FRBM, ca. 1968. BL000573, 
GBP, BHL.
Fig. 06
Catenary sketch by Gunnar Birkerts and 
others for the FRBM, ca. 1968. BL000574, 
GBP, BHL.
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The origins of that enduring image are uncertain at best. 
What few sketches remain were done on ruled paper annotated with 
numerical calculations and other notes that suggest they were working 
documents rather than sacred artistic “embryos”17 (figs. 05, 06). The fact 
that these sketches are façade studies rather than capturing the general 
massing of the building or its plan also suggests that they may have 
been produced rather late in the design process. Birkerts himself char-
acterized them not as sketches but as “talking papers,” collaborative 
documents in which “[Leslie] Robertson and I discussed the structural 
concept possibilities.”18 In fact, it is likely that the FRBM design concept 
of a suspension bridge-as-office building –undeniably the project’s most 
defining gesture– did not develop from an individual moment of inspira-
tion but instead through the negotiating of the conflicting programmatic 
requirements and in conversation with the structural engineers Leslie 
Robertson and John V. Christiansen of SHCR.19 Because of the process 
through which it was imagined, skepticism persists about whose “author-
ship” the building design truly embodies. 
Even today, the most familiar narrative of interpretive 
labor in architectural practice remains the translation from sketch 
into building. This was the way Birkerts preferred to explain the work-
ing method within his eponymous firm –the process would begin with 
imaginative, “embryonic” sketches, which acquired greater interpretive 
depth throughout the process until the completion of construction. Nar-
ratives such as this have always obfuscated the detours and dead ends 
of the design process as well as the labor of subordinates, and have also 
served to delimit the “proper” extents of architectural services. Execu-
tive architects like Birkerts, for example, could have committed –as 
principals of some large firms did– to providing a more comprehensive 
array of services through internal specialization.20 But this would have 
required setting aside the established definition of the architect as an in-
dependent generalist in the art of building. Architects like Birkerts would 
never have done so, because they believed specialization and hierarchy 
would undermine their authorial claims. 
Notwithstanding architects’ ideological aver-
sion to hierarchy, certain tasks were habitually 
delegated. One of the most common, at least in 
the design of office buildings, was interior de-
sign. This less heroic mode of design was all too 
often delegated to women architects. Interior 
design’s influence over the perceived success of a building can of course 
be sizable. Nevertheless, some architects’ chauvinistic attitude toward 
accommodating the desires of occupant groups in their designs made 
them ill-equipped to be involved in such work. This was particularly true 
of executive architects like Birkerts, who dismissively wrote of such de-
sires: “Most of the time it really boils down to a few short sentences. They 
like warmth. They like to feel cozy. They want a good view to the outside, 
but they want to feel protected at the same time.”21 Because designers 
of interiors (whether or not they adopt the title “interior designer”) are 
concerned with designing and selecting the materials, furnishings, and 
objects that building occupants will interact with on a daily basis, and 
because they are often involved in extended negotiations relating human 
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In many cases, women had little choice but to specialize in 
interiors. As Gwendolyn Wright has put it, women “have had to resort to 
their own, less conspicuous roles in order to secure a place” in architectural 
practice.22 The GBA associate Barbara J. Bos may have faced this kind of 
choice in the early 1970s. Having trained as an architect in the undergradu-
ate program at the University of California Los Angeles in the late 1960s, 
Bos was fully qualified to practice in other capacities, but perhaps found 
that taking charge of GBA’s work on interiors was her most readily acces-
sible path to design autonomy. No matter the motivation, by taking on this 
role, she eventually became the first female partner in Birkerts’s firm.
A second “opposite” in the FRBM design was between the 
distinctive, highly specific design of the building’s massing, exterior, and 
services and the ostensibly flexible, adaptable office interiors. In contra-
distinction to the client’s stated desire for flexibility, GBA tried to exert 
considerable control over the interiors of the building over the long term. 
To address concerns that the clear organizational systems that guided 
GBA’s interiors would be lost or compromised as furniture was replaced 
or supplemented, Bos developed a “ruleset” to guide the client. Elements 
at play included full-height demountable walls, panelized office divid-
ers, and a furniture system custom designed by GBA for production by 
the General Fireproofing Company of Youngstown, Ohio. Among other 
instructions, those installing furniture were to “maintain an unobstructed 
5’–0 corridor” along the curtain walls, group demountable offices togeth-
er to share walls, keep these offices away from the elevator lobby, place 
entrances to offices and workstations away from the main corridors, and, 
generally, avoid overusing demountable partitions to divide up the office 
floors. Bos’s concise instruction manual guided inexperienced Federal 
Reserve Bank bureaucrats through the murky process of interior design 
(figs. 07, 08, 09). This was a thankless task; documentation of the results is 
scant, and almost no mention is made in press coverage of GBA’s exten-
sive work on the office interiors. 
Despite positive responses to the building in the press 
and among critics, a nagging feeling that Birkerts had not maintained his 
usual level of control over the FRBM’s design seems to have persisted. 
As the unabashed face of his firm, Birkerts was more than happy to take 
full credit for the building in the press. Yet it was precisely because of his 
detachment from the more pragmatic day-to-day work of interpreting his 
intentions and satisfying the desires of its users that Birkerts was able to 
see the building as an aesthetic statement, autonomous in its imaginative 
abstraction. In the years that followed, Birkerts became ever more chau-
vinistic about reserving authorship within the early stages of the process 
for himself. He asserted his preeminence by funneling design through 
“embryo” sketches that could be produced only by him. Though FRBM 
was his best-known building, it also proved the most difficult to replicate, 
perhaps because staff burnout and turnover prevented the lessons from 
it from being carried over to other projects. 
In a study of how firms weathered the economic 
uncertainty of the 1970s, the sociologist Judith 
R. Blau found that a wider distribution of author-
ity and “voice” among employees was highly 
correlated to a firm’s “effectiveness as a profes-
sional organization” (as measured by several 
Fig. 07
Drawings by GBA’s Barbara J. Bos, 
page 3, guidelines for the deployment 
of demountable partitions in the FRBM 
interiors, 1974. Box 19, GBA, BHL.
Fig. 08
Drawings by GBA’s Barbara J. Bos, 
page 4, guidelines for the deployment 
of demountable partitions in the FRBM 
interiors, 1974. Box 19, GBA, BHL.
Fig. 09
Drawings by Barbara J. Bos of GBA, 
page 5, guidelines for the deployment of 
workstations and other furniture in the 





Interior of the purchasing department 
on floor 2, the FRBM office tower, with 
workstations and demountable partitions 
by General Fireproofing at left, and the 
bottom of the catenary suspension 
structure at right. Photograph by 
Balthazar Korab, courtesy Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, 
Balthazar Korab Collection.
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factors including design awards, expert evaluations, repeat clients and 
referrals, profitability, productivity, and the commitment of its staff).23 But 
her caveat was that, “[t]he more individuals who share responsibility for a 
project, the more likely is the firm to receive few awards.”24 It seems that a 
collective voice, despite the managerial advantage of motivating employ-
ees through distributed responsibility, did not necessarily yield building 
designs of high merit. To a certain extent, this conclusion confirms the 
view held by Birkerts that individual authors create great architecture, 
but Blau instead used it to highlight an equally foundational dilemma for 
architectural practice: creating great architecture does not necessarily 
lead to employee satisfaction or a sustainable business. Many architects 
intuitively perceived this, and saw it as an inevitable contradiction be-
tween success in business and success in design.
As a result of this conundrum, what evolved in many, if 
not most architecture firms in the United States was, therefore, neither 
an “architecture of genius” nor an “architecture of bureaucracy,” but a 
mongrel practice that incorporated the most alienating elements of both.25 
Studying architectural firms’ piecemeal adoption of bureaucratic “best 
practices,” guided by organizations like the AIA and publications like The 
Architect’s Handbook, can reveal the extent to which they were subject 
to “isomorphism,” a term used by organizational theorists to describe the 
adoption of similar structures and practices within a field.26 The factors 
outlined above led to a scenario in which executive architects, on the one 
hand, monopolized the creative, design-oriented tasks for which all archi-
tects are primarily trained. Employee architects, on the other hand, were 
left with immense amounts of what Graeber called “interpretive labor” 
so as to maintain a chain of authorial intention over which they had little 
influence and in which they may have had little investment. This mode of 
organization (whether viewed as rational or irrational) had been passed on 
through the institutional structuring of architectural practice as well as by 
example, resulting in relative homogeneity across the market sector.27 
To a great extent, the working methods of GBA were mold-
ed in response to Birkerts’s experiences while employed in the office of 
Eero Saarinen in the 1950s. By contrast to Birkerts, Saarinen approached 
design in an evolutionary way, where associates generated seemingly 
infinite variations of aspects of a building design, from which Saarinen 
himself would then select the most successful iterations with which to 
move forward. This meant that Saarinen delegated aspects of the pro-
cess that Birkerts felt should belong to the executive architect alone. In 
reflections on his apprenticeship, Birkerts indicted Saarinen for what he 
perceived to be a lack of decisiveness or creative bravery.28 Yet, viewed 
differently, Saarinen’s working method empowered employee architects 
and thereby nurtured the development of a host of independent voices. 
Despite the seeming redundancy of the organizational signature of his 
office, Saarinen created an environment that fostered more of the “right” 
kind of imagination (creative exploration), while minimizing the “wrong” 
kind (interpretive labor).29 
The methods established at GBA created almost the 
opposite scenario. Because Birkerts monopolized decisions on many 
aspects of building design, he created bottlenecks during certain parts 
of the process, when others simply had to wait for him to produce a new 
sketch. Instead of fostering the kind of creative competitiveness that 
launched numerous Saarinen employees into independent success, 
Birkerts instilled loyalty in some, while frustrating others. GBA employ-
ees found themselves with limited access to the originary moments of 
architectural imagination, and spent most of their effort interpreting or 
expounding the authorial intentions outlined by Birkerts himself. 
This has had considerable impact on the historiography of 
the Birkerts firm, which has to date focused overwhelmingly on his biog-
raphy and personality. Considerable consequence has been attributed 
to Birkerts’s own “talking papers,” while little weight has been attributed 
to ostensibly less beguiling paperwork like Bos’s furniture guidelines. The 
wrongheaded gendering of particular design tasks further reinforced this 
tendency. However, given the critical importance of the post-occupancy 
phase in the long-term judgment of architectural success, we might today 
rightly question which had more impact on the architecture (fig. 10).
While the dominant “structure of feeling” within architec-
ture firms like GBA may have been a commitment to legitimating the 
vision provided by a firm figurehead, this unequal distribution undeniably 
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resulted in frustration, immiseration, and overwork, while all credit flowed 
to the figurehead or executive architect.30 Indeed, employee architects 
committed themselves to this labor of interpretation when taking jobs in 
firms of this kind, but such hierarchies were not inevitable and certainly 
not permanent. Those who are comfortable with the status quo prefer 
to act as if these hierarchies of clout and monopolies of access do not 
exist, while others may be structurally unable to see them as anything 
but a natural result of what it means to do architectural work. Addressing 
the unequal distribution of imaginative tasks and restructuring architec-
ture’s pyramid of paperwork remains necessary in order to build a more 
inclusive and more fulfilling profession. To continue to ignore the problem 
would be to perpetuate an exploitative system and to set future archi-
tects up for ever-more drudgery and powerlessness. RA
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